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'Super Paradox' or 'Leninist Integration': 
The Politics of Legislating Article 23 of 
the Basic Law in Post-handover Hong Kong 
Wong Yiu-chung 
Abstract 
Liao Zhengzhi, t的he la切α叫t仿e director of t的he Ofj伊ìc臼e of HOl啥1哼g Kong αn叫dλMαcauJ 
Aβρair.爪戶
Hong Ko 咚 needed 0仰nl抄ytωoc彷hα仰nge t的hej戶7α句g α仰ndB品r吋吋社叫叫it削侃!活蚵忱i瓦.臼sh g伊Oν陀er仲間noωr aft仿er the 
Hα仰nd，伽'over. While the press was full of doomsday prophecies about Hong 
Kong s future , there was another camp of 'super-paradox' theorists who 
genuinely believed that Hong Kong s status quo would not changed after 
the Handove r, for an authoritarian one PQ1吵 -dominated PRC could 
absorb a free- flowing Hong Kong without changing the nature of an 
open society. Contrary to doomsday prophets and 'super-paradox' 
theorists, this paper argues that, on the one hand, the doomsday prophecy 
was groundless, but on the other hand, important institutioval changes 
did take place even though bal叫y noticed. lt is argued, by using the 
example ofthe legislation of Article 刃， that a gradual approach has been 
adopted by the CCP to change the fundamentals of Hong Kong s polity, 
a strategy that 1 call 'Leninist integration' 
Introduction 
Hong Kong had been a British colony for 155 years before the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) resumed its sovereignty over Hong 
Kong on 1 July 1997. 
Since then, more than eight years have passed and Hong Kong has 
experienced momentous changes. In particular, the marching of half a 
million people protesting against the legislation of the Article 23 of the 
Basic Law on 1 July 2003 marked the turning point in the post-Handover 
Hong Kong political development, which subsequently led to the 
resignation of the Chief Executive (CE) Tung Chee-hwa. A 
‘super-paradox' theory, however, circulated after the Handover, which 
basically argued that despite the sovereignty retrocession, nothing in 
Hong Kong had changed and a free Hong Kong remained the same and 
Beijing was content to leave Hong Kong alone. 1 Nothing, however, was 
further from the truth. In fact, the ‘super-paradox' theorists were too 
impatient and if only they could wait two or three years, they could have 
seen that the ‘paradox' had dissolved and Beijing's grip on Hong Kong 
has been tightening as time goes by. The introduction of the 
"accountability" system concentrated the power on the Chief Executive, 
abolishing the Chief Secretary as the head of the civil service and making 
the post constitutionally redundant. 
ln April 2004, Beijing's second interpretation of the Basic Law on 
Hong Kong's political development intensified the trend. Beijing adopts 
an incremental approach of what 1 call “Leninist integration", by which 
al1 authoritarian PRC could severely restrict the pace of democratization 
and the civilliberties of Hong Kongers. In this paper, 1 would argue that 
the legislation of the Article 23 in Hong Kong was, in fact, one of the 
measures through which Beijing implements the tactics of “Leninist 
il1tegration" and was the most dramatic step to change the nature of Hong 
Kong as a free society by making use of the UK's law abiding tradition. 
At the same time, 1 would also use the case to illustrate' the 
post-Handover political development in Hong Kong in general. 
The paper also attempts to analyze the origin of Artic1e 23 in the 
Basic Law and the viewpoints of different social and political groups 
pCliinent to the issue. Why are Hong Kong people so worried about 
such legislation? 可That are the social and political forces that lend support 
to the pro and con camps? What are the deep-seated reasons that 
characterize such heated debates? The paper further examines the 
impact that would be felt on Hong Kong SAR as an intemational city and 
the consequences if the Article is enacted. 
The Origin of Article 23 
Hong Kong people were presented with the Hobsonian choice in the 
matter of sovereignty change in 1997. The PRC refused to allow Hong 
Kong to be involved in the negotiation with the British govemment. In 
order to restore the confidence of local people and to honour its pledge 
2 
not to meddle with the intemal affairs of Hong Kong after the Handover, 
the PRC drafted the te叮itory's mini-constitution-the Basic Law, 
supposedly to embody the principle of ‘one country, two systems' which 
gives a high degree of autonomy to Hong Kong. The drafting ofthe Basic 
Law lasted for five years and it was completed in 1990. The Law was 
promulgated by the National People 's Congress (NPC) in April 1990 to 
be effective after 1 July 1997. Among all the provisions in the Basic Law, 
however, none is more controversial than Article 23. Despite Donald 
Tsang, the new CE, having promised not to reintroduce legislation in his 
remaining two- year term, even today, the society at large is still divided 
over the content or substance of the Article, the pace of legislation or 
even the necessity of legislating such a law. 
The provlslOn of Article 23 in the Basic Law states simply that 
“ The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its 
own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against 
the Central People 's Govemment, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit 
foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political 
activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies 
of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organization or 
bodies." 
The A‘rticle had undergone several formulations before it took the 
final shape. The June 4 massacre was the single most important event 
impacting upon the drafting. The present form was introduced only in the 
aftermath ofthe June 4 crackdown. As is well recorded, the issue ofHong 
Kong sovereignty emerged in the late 1970s. From 1981 to 1983 the 
British govemment and China negotiated an agreement supposedly to the 
satisfaction of three sides. 2 The Sino-British Joint Declaration was 
signed in 1984 and in 1985, the PRC set up a Basic Law Drafting 
Committee (BLDC) to dra缸 the Basic Law and along the Dra丘ing
Committee, a Basic Law Consultative Committee (BLCC), composed of 
150 members, was set up to solicit ideas or opinion from Hong Kong 
general public. 
The 1980s was the most liberal era in China since the founding ofthe 
PRC. Having discarded the shackles of Maoist dogma, Deng Xiaoping 
became the de facto supreme Party/state leader and launched the four 
modemization programs in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) Congress in late 1978. His reform and open door 
policies heralded a new epoch in China's development. He was assisted 
by tbe two reform-minded senior pa吐y leaders-Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang.3 Deng also adopted a pragmatic pos仙re in foreign policy. The 
astute and peaceful diplomatic solving of the sovereignty issue of Hong 
Kong manifested a spirit of realism pervading tbe Basic Law. 
1ncidentally, Cbina's intention of drafting a ‘good' mini-constitution 
for Hong Kong was evident from the start. For all its authoritarian 
twists, the BLDC incorporated two most outspoken and articulate 
democI前s from Hong Kong, namely Martin Lee Cbu-ming, a 
widely-beld as the fatber of democracy and Szeto Wah, a trade unionist. 
China nominated two-thirds of the members. One-third of its members 
came from Hong Kong and most of them were political conservatives or 
pro-Beijing establishment figures. A majority, therefore, was guaranteed 
for tbe China status quo. 
After three years of drafting, tbe BLDC published the first dra缸 of
Basic Law for consultation in April 1988. Tbe then subversion Artic1e 22 
read as follows,“Tbe Hong Kong SAR govemment shall prohibit by law 
any act designed to undermine national unity or subvert the central 
people's govemment." 1n retrospect, thougb ambiguous, the provision 
was certainly much less harsb than tbe later versions. However, upon 
being released, the article was heavily criticized by the legal community 
and libera\-minded legislators. Most criticism stressed tbat the wording 
was too vague and covered a variety of activities that were guaranteed by 
tbe Sino-British Joint Declaration but would be considered illegal under 
the Law. The criticism led to a totally reworded new Arti c1e 23 in tbe 
second draft of the Basic Law in February 1989. 1n the new dra缸， the 
Article said that Hong Kong SAR “ sha11 enact laws on its own to prohibit 
any act of treason, secession, sedition or theft of state secrets". The 
offences were more precise and, in general , it was agreed tbat the notation 
was consistent with Hong Kong common law tradition and, moreover, it 
has the important words "on its own" which allows the Hong Kong SAR 
to enact tbe law by itself after 1997 and seems to respect the autonomy of 
Hong Kong 
However, the events of June 4 1989 cbanged a11 tbese. The death of 
former CCP general secretary Hu Yaobang on 15 April triggered tbe 
largest social movement in several decades in the PRC. The pioneers 
were the university students but the movement was participated in by a11 
walks of life. For two months, thousands of pe 
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‘princelings' , and political reform. Deng Xiaoping responded with brutal 
force. The armored cars and tanks rolled on the Chang An Avenue and the 
demonstrations were crushed. The clock stopped clicking in Beijing and 
the work of both BLDC and BLCC were suspended indefinitely. 
In the months of April and May 1989, when the pro-democracy 
move l11ent was at its height, Hong Kong people manifested unfailing 
efforts in their support for the l110vement. 4 In May, twice there were 
more than one million people flooding on to the streets to show support 
for the students and protest against the declaration of martial law in 
Beijing by Li Peng, then Chinese premier. Unfortunate旬， the support 
went afou l. After the massacre, more than three hundred thousand people 
assembled in the Happy Valley horse race course to moum the thousands 
ofvictims suppressed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Moreover, 
hundreds of pro-democracy activists such as Chai Ling, Lee Lu, Feng 
Cunde, Zhang Boli and Wuer Kaixi and including famous intellectuals 
Yìn Jiaqi, Chen Yizi, Wan Runnan, Chen yi and Su Xiaokan in the 
move l11ent escaped to Westem countries through clandestine channels in 
Hong Kong organized by the Hong Kopg Alliance in Support of the 
Patriotic Democratic Movement in China and Hong Kong underground 
societi es. 5 
Hong Kong was publicly accused by Li Hou, then vice director ofthe 
Office of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, as being the biggest subveI討ve
base against the PRC govemment. The relations between Hong Kong and 
Beijing became extremely tense. A丘er the resumption of work, BLDC 
reviewed the Basic Law provisions and Article 23 took its present form as 
events unfolded. The wording of subversion against the central 
govemment was inselied in the aftermath ofthe June 4 events, which was 
in response to the subversive role of Hong Kong in the events. The final 
version of the Basic Law was promulgated in April 1990. 
Events Triggering the Legislation of the Article 
In the first term (1 997-2002) of Tung Chee-hwa, Beijing adopted a 
relatively non-interventionist posture towards Hong Kong, except the 
NPC interpretation on the right of abode of the mainland- bom children 
of Hong Kong residents in 1999. “Public Order ordinance" and "Societies 
ordinance" \vere passed after the Handover to deal with issues of social 
order, demonstrations and relations between local political groups and 
foreign political organizations, but not other more sensitive political 
measures. However, there had been several incidents since the Handover 
that put Hong Kong SAR govemment in an embarrassing position 
because there is a lack of ordinances to deal with sensitive political issues 
in Hong Kong in particular regarding national territorial integrity and 
govemment confidential documents. Although the issues were resolved 
by political/administrative measures permanent damage has been done for 
Hong Kong and the image of mle of law was tamished. More importantly, 
Beijing was determined that such emba叮assments would not happen 
again and its move to push the Hong Kong SAR govemment to legislate 
Article 23 was as urgent as ever when Tung's first term was approaching 
its end. The following incidents certainly forced the Tung 
administration as well as Beijing to rethink the pace of the legislation of 
the Article: 
的 Cheng An-kuo Incident 
Cheng An-kuo was nomina lIy the general manger of the Chung Hwa 
Travel Service but he was then, in fact, the de facto highest official of 
Taiwan in Hong Kong. In July 1999, Lee Teng-hui, then Taiwan 
president, talking to a German weekly joumalist, proposed a “ two state" 
theory regarding international status of Taiwan, in which he rejected the 
claims by the PRC that Taiwan is a local govemment while Beijing is the 
central govemment; instead two political entities are of equal status. 
Taiwan and the PRC are in a state-to-state relationship. 
As expected, the theory was strongly attacked by the Beijing 
media.On 17 July 1999, Cheng An-kuo was invited to talk in a radio 
program of RTHK, govemment-sponsored radio, called Hong Kong 
Letter, in which he defended the "two states" theory. The ‘letter' 
engendered a strong reaction from the local pro-CCP groups. Ma Lik, a 
NPC deputy and now chairman of the Democratic Alliance for the 
Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB)、 attacked Cheng 's speech on the radio 
as disseminating the idea of Taiwanese independence, which has 
secession intention and impact. He urged the Hong Kong government to 
draft Article 23 legislation as early as possible. On 19 August 1999, then 
vice premier Qian Qichen stepped in and stated publicly that Hong Kong 
should not promote the ‘two states' idea as it contravenes Beij in皂 ' s seven 
principles which have governed the Hong Kong- Taiwan relationships 
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since 1997.6 For the existing laws in Hong Kong simply cannot handle 
the issues. 
b) Lu Hsin-Iien Incident 
Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu Hsin-Lien were first elected Taiwan 's 
president and vice- president in March 2000. A丘er the elections, the 
Hong Kong Cable TV interviewed Lu on 29 March 2000 and the next day 
it was broadcast for two days. In the interview, Annette Lu reiterated the 
official position of the Democratic Progressive Party, which was that 
Taiwan should have independence and the Taiwanese people did not want 
to reunify with the Mainland. 
Once again, Beijing reacted angrily and the People s Daily published 
several articles condemning the views of Annette Lu. Locally; Wang 
Fengchao, deputy director of Central Govemment Liaison Office, 
delivered a speech entitled “The principle of one China and the Taiwan 
issue" at a seminar organized by the Hong Kong Joumalist Association 
on 12 April 2000, with the senior management personnel of the mass 
media as his audience. 
At the outset, Wang excluded information about Taiwan reunification 
from normal news items. He argued that the reunification with Taiwan is 
an utterly important issue for the country and, therefore, it is the 
responsibilities of Hong Kong reporters “to uphold integrity and 
sovereignty of the country and not to advocate the 'two states' theory. 
This, according to his logic, has nothing to do with normal press 
freedom. ,,7 Wang hinted that the Article 23 on treason and subversion 
should be enacted as quickly as possible. 
In fact, there was a related incident conceming Annette Lu and 
RTI-到丈 . So Wing-hong is a famous Hong Kong singer and he was found 
taking drugs in a Taiwan karaoki and arrested. A缸er the trial he was 
sentenced to twelve days of rehabilitation. He was found to have good 
behavior and was released two days early. So far, everything was fine. 
However, during his stay in the rehabilitation centre, Annette Lu came to 
visit the center and they held a pa口y in which So was joyously singing 
with Lu. This created a headline in Hong Kong as Lu was a political 
figure. After So came back to Hong Kong, Che Suk-ml泣， a DJ in the 
RTHK, wanted to arrange a dialogue between Lu and So on the radio. 
The news immediately became a bomb shell in Hong Kong. The old 
problem arose; should a govemment-sponsored radio interview (or let her 
have a chance to talk) Annette Lu, who is the number two pro-Taiwan 
independence figure? Should RTHK become a propaganda machine of 
the govemment which is in conflict with the role long played by the 
station? Henry Tang yi月-yen， then secretary responsible for 
broadcasting policy, intervened and the dialogue was dead.8 
c) Li Xiaomin Incident 
Li Xiaomin is a Mainland Chinese scholar who has a Princeton Ph D 
in sociology and is a naturalized American. He was teaching at the City 
University of Hong Kong when he was arrested by the security forces in 
Shenzhen on 25 February 200 l. He was sent to Beijing for trial and found 
guilty of theft the of PRC govemment classified documents. Furthermore, 
he was alleged to have been spying for Taiwan. The PRC court 
sentenced him to ten years of imprisonment but later deported him to the 
USA because of American govemment intervention. The tricky point was 
that, after several months, he was able to come back to Hong Kong and 
resume his teaching duty at the City University. 
Li 's retum to Hong Kong successfully aroused bitter debatesamong 
pro-one- country and pro-two- systems camps in Hong Kong. The bone 
of contention was about the extent of territorial jurisdiction of the 
Mainland China court verdict. The pro-two-systems camp claimed it is 
legitimate for him to come back because Hong Kong practiced ‘one 
country, two systems刊 and Hong Kong's legal system is different 仕om
that of the PRC; therefore, the mainland's legal jurisdiction did not cover 
Hong Kong. However, the pro-one-country camp argued that Li should 
have been barred, because the legal jurisdiction of the Mainland court 
decision should be extended to Hong Kong since Hong Kong is a part of 
the PRC. When Li was sentenced to imprisonment and later, deported 
out of ‘Chinese territories' , what does ‘Chinese territories' mean? Does it 
mean ‘ legal territories' by which Hong Kong has a distinctive system or 
does it mean ‘geographical telTitories' in which Hong Kong is a pari of 
the PRC. If it is the former, Li evidently could come back because his 
verdict by Mainland court became invalid, and his conviction certainly 
would affect his retum but if it is the latter, he would be sent into prison 
once he set foot in Hong Kong. 
On the surface, it seems that the pro-two-systems camp triumphed 
and Beijing seems to have adopted a lenient approach in Li's case. 
However, without the backing of the US govemment, Li's entry to Hong 
Kong was doubtfu l. The incident evidently involved intemational 
relationships, in particular Sino-American relation. The collision between 
a Chinese jet fighter and an American surveillance plane over South 
China Sea in April 2001 , which led to the death of a Chinese pilot and the 
detention of twenty four US crew members and the plane in the PRC , 
produced a cold war between the PRC and USA. The crisis was solved 
only by strenuous diplomatic efforts on both sides. Then 
Sino-American relationships began to warm up. It was at this time that 
the spy case of Li Xiaomin occurred and it must be bom in mind that Li is 
an American citizen and his retum was accompanied by a US Consular 
officer at the airport. Li was detained for six hours in the airport. It was 
most likely that, during the six hours, Beijing was consulted whether to 
allow Li back to Hong Kong. ‘One country' always predominates over 
'two systems\Ma Lik once again raised in the mass media the issue of 
legislating Article 23. 
d) Fa/un Gong Incident 
Among these incidents, the Falun Gong movement in Hong Kong 
was perhaps the most sensitive and complicated issue and caused 
embarrassment both for Hong Kong SAR govemment and Beij ing. 
Falun Gong was outlawed by the NPC after thousands of its followers 
encircled Zhongnanh剖， the nerve center of the CCP power, in 1999. 
Since then, the Falun Gong movement has been brutally suppressed in 
China and thousands of believers were jailed, as the CCP perceived the 
movement as a threat to the regime. ln Hong Kong, Falun Gong was 
registered as a social organization under the Society Ordinance in 1996 
and their breathing practice was conducted publicly and peacefuJl y. Even 
a自er its banning in Mainland, their activities were all within the confines 
of Hong Kong laws and it would be illegitimate to outlaw the movement. 
As an intemational city, Hong Kong is being closely watched by 
intemational mass media. Even though Tung Chee-hwa gradually 
moved from a neutral position to a position that pronounced that 'Falun 
Gong is more or less an evil cult' and then to a standpoint that firmly 
declared Falun Gong is an evil cult in a span of two years from 2000 to 
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2002, the Hong Kong SAR government could do nothing about it. That 
could explain why the Beijing government was so pushy in urging Hong 
Kong government to legislate Article 23. 
The Views of Beijing 
Since the inception of the second term of Tung Chee-hwa's 
administration in July 2002, the pressure on the HKSAR government to 
enact the security laws had been mounting. There is no doubt that Beijing 
wanted the SAR government to legislate as quickly as possible, as the 
Central government cannot enact the law for the HK SAR. Their reason is 
simple: because it is stated in the Basic Law that the SAR government 
should enact locally laws regarding subversion, secession, and sedition. It 
is against the constitution if the SAR government does not. More 
important紗， the first term of Tung (1 997-2002) had gone and the Taiwan 
political scene was dominated by pro-independence figures. Li Teng-hui 's 
pro-independence stand had become increasingly explici t. ln 2000 Chen 
Shui-bian was elected as Taiwan's president. 
On the tenth anniversary of the promulgation of the Basic Law in 
2000, Qian Xiaoyan, then vice-chairman of the Legislative A在alrs
Committee of the NPC, reiterated that the enactment of the article was 
important because it involved sovereignty and the unification of the 
nation. He was celiainly referring to Taiwan when he mentioned the issue 
of unification. In a meeting between Qiao and Elsie Leung, Secretary of 
Justice, in Beijing, Qiao emphatically said that “Under the Basic Law, the 
SAR has a duty and responsibility to enact the law.. ..it has to do it as 
soon as possible. ,,9 On the same day, in a meeting with Elsie Leunιthe 
then NPC chairman Li Peng publicly pushed Hong Kong for quickened 
legislation. Elsie Leun皂 repeated what Li had told her that the SAR has an 
obligation to enact the law, though Li had not put any pressure on her to 
speed up the process. 10 Later in an interview with Hong Kong television 
broadcasting station TVB , Qian Qichen, the vice premier, explicitly 
pointed out that the Falun Gong should be outlawed in Hong Kong if it 
maintained ties with foreign groups after the enactment of the 
anti-subversion law. 11 
ln Hong Kong, before her resignation in April 2001 , Anson Chan, 
Chief Secretary for Administration, obviously did not think that the 
legislation was urgent. ln fact, she stated that the legislation of the Art icle 
10 
23 was of such a sensitive nature that the government should consult 
widely before it made any decision. She argued that nothing can 
chaIlenge the Basic Law and we should respect aIl aliicles in the Basic 
Law including freedom of speech, press and etc, but we should not rush 
to a decision. Elsie Leung said that the govemment would not make this 
law rashly and it would consult wide sectors of society before the 
enactment. To put down people 's worries, she added that by aIlowing the 
enactment of this article locaIly, the Central govemment, in fact, 
understood that the degree of human rights and freedom in Hong Kong 
and mainland China were different. 
Moreover, to further aIlay the fear of Hong Kongers, she pointed out 
that according to Article 39 of the Basic Law, the provisions of the 
lntemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as applied to Hong 
Kong remained in force and therefore the rights of and freedom enjoyed 
by Hong Kongers would not be restricted. She also pledged that she 
would stand up to Beijing if it wants Hong Kong to pass laws on sedition 
and subversion which would breach intemational safeguards on human 
rights. She assured Hong Kong people that ‘'The purpose of the 
legislation is not to target any particular group.... 1 don 't think there is 
actuaIly a threat. 1 believe the law is there in case there is a need to use 
it.,, 12 FUlihermore, she added that if everyone is sincere in doing 泣， it 
needed only a few years to complete the enactment, as most of the clauses 
would be based on the existing ordinances. Lau Siu-k缸， the chief advisor 
for Central Policy Unit, even went to predict that the legislation could be 
completed within two or three years. 13 However, according to Zhang Xin, 
a noted Chinese legal specialist based in the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, the gap between Hong Kong 's conception of sedition and 
subversion and China 's is so great that, it is difficult not to caπy 
“ Chinese characteristics" ifthe Article were enacted. 14 
The Consultative Process 
FinaIIy, the Hong Kon皂 SAR govemment published the consuItation 
document (hereafter the Document) on proposals to implement Article 23 
of the Basic Law on 24 September 2002; the consultation period would 
last for three months, with the aim of passing the Bi Il in July 2003. The 
Document stated that the HKSAR govemment “has both practical and 
legal obligations to implement Article 23. . ..The intent... is to prohibit by 
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law acts that would undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity 
and national security of our country. " 的 In arguing for the introduction 
of the proposal , Regina Ip said that " There are few people [in Hong 
Kong] who are imbued with the concept of protecting one 's 
country... .Security lies at the heart of our well-being. lt is the cornerstone 
of the smooth running of our society." 16 The Document covers seven 
areas of offences, including treason, secession, sedition, sedition, 
subversion, theft of state secrets, foreign political organizations and the 
police investigative powers. 17 In fact, among the proposed offences, 
some were already dealt with under Hong Kong existing legislations. Part 
1 and 11 of the Crimes Ordinance deal with treason and sedition 
respectively. The Offzcial Secrets Ordinance deals with spying and 
unlawful disclosure of the official confidential information. The Societies 
Ordinance regulates , inter al悶， the activities of organizations and their 
ties with foreign political organizations. 
In the course of consultation, both the publicity style of senior 
officials and the substances of the Document were heavily criticized by 
society at large and the legal community in particular. Regina Ip Lau 
Suk-y白， the Security Secretary, who was responsible for marketing the 
Document, was perceived to be too anogant and pushy and very often 
discussion was impossible when she was present. After 1 July, she 
resigned the post of the Security secretary. 18 At the end of the 
consultation period, 100,909 submissions were received by the 
government of which 97,097 were local. Without analyzing the 
submissions properly, the government submitted the National Security 
Bill (Legal form of Aliicle 23) to the Legislative Council (LegCo) for the 
first reading on 26 February 2003. 
Despite the concessions by the govemment, such as the relaxation of 
the proscription mechanism and "a careful effort to strike a balance 
between protecting national security and safeguarding fundamental ri ghts 
and freedoms" , 19 the Security Bill stiU suffered a number of drawbacks 
According to the Aliicle 23 Concem Group, whose membership consisted 
of Audrey Eu, Alan Leong, Ronny Tong, Margaret N皂， all LegCo 
members and lawyers and other legal professionals, the Bill contained a 
number of major problems: 1) The proscription mechanism goes beyond 
the requirements in Article 23 , and it threatens freedom 
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because there is no public interest or prior publication defence;3) The 
offence of sedition endangers freedom of speech because it is defined as 
indictment to commit treason, subversion and succession, and incitement 
can be committed by mere speech without any unlawful act; 4) The 
wording in many parts of the Bill is too vague; 5)Apart from treason, all 
Article 23 offences apply to all Hong Kong permanent residents wherever 
their nationality and whatever they live and for what they do in or outside 
Hong Kong;6) It abolishes important safe皂uards in the existing law that 
prosecution of treason should be within 3 years and sedition within 6 
months; 7)There is no reason to give the chief superintendent the power 
to approve police break in, search and seizure of property, which is given 
now by the cou此， etc. 20 
As is well known, the CCP both represents and govems the country 
in the PRC. The four cardinal principles are enshrined in the PRC 
constitution, the most important of which is the rule of the CCP21 • The 
Party monopolizes political power, allowing no organized opposition, not 
to mention popular elections in rotating the government. Any criticism of 
the govemment and the CCP even verbally could be construed as having 
seditious intention to overthrow the state. This practically makes the CCP 
immune from criticism and thus, freedom of speech is practically ruled 
out from daily life and any activities on the part of citizens who are 
perceived to be threat to the CCP Party!state could be liable for 
prosecution under these provisions. Under the PRC's criminal law, it is 
difficult to distinguish between sedition and exerclsmg genuine 
rights!freedom of speech. Hong Kong public feared that by interpreting 
the seditious offences to such an extent, the CCP could potentially 
eliminate the fundamental rights pledged to HK citizens in the Basic Law. 
As observed from Hong Kong, there were cases showing the arbitrary 
application of criminal laws involving security issues in China. One 
notable example is the case of Wang Dang, the number one hunted 
student leader in the aftermath of June 4 events and now studying in 
Harvard University. He was hunted down by the security forces and 
imprisoned for four years. A丘er his release , Wang stayed at home and 
wrote articles in overseas publication criticizing the CCP. 1n 1996, he was 
aITested again and charged with subversion and seditious offences. 
Wang had written about th 
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subversion and sedition under the Chinese Criminal Laws. 22 He was 
subsequently sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. 1n April 1998, 
Wang was released on medical parole and exiled to the USA; andthis was 
possible mainly due to the diplomatic pressure of the US govemment, in 
particular after the visit of President Bill Clinton to China.23 For Hong 
Kong people, Wang Dang 's case was only one of the many that totally 
ignored human rights in the PRC. The Iegislation of the Article 23 
aroused the worries that the arbitrary use of the criminal Iaws and 
procedures could be transplanted to Hong Kong and would lead to 
subsequent loss of citizen rights enjoyed before the Handover. 
The Standpoints of Different Political/Social Groups 
The Democratic Pω'ty 
Once the most in f1 uential political party in Hong Kong, The 
Democratic Party (DP) did not oppose the legislation itself but argued 
that sufficient preparation should be made before legislation and that the 
provisions should not run in counter to the 1ntemational Covenant for 
Political and Social Rights. Legislator Cheung Man-kwong suggested that 
the best option was not to legislate the Article as Hong Kong already has 
similar laws in dealing with treason, public order and intemal turmoi l. 
Furthermore, Martin Lee, then chairman of the DP, argued that since the 
promulgation of the Basic Law, the political situation has been stable , the 
transition and the Handover has been smooth, and there are no political 
groups which oppose unification and national territorial integrity, 
therefore it is unnecessary to legislate the anti-subversion law, a move 
that would certainly divide Hong Kong society. He further argued that the 
DP fully supp0l1s ‘one China' policy and the reunification ofTaiwan. The 
Falun Gong members have been peaceful demonstrators in Hong Kong. 
He urged the Hong Kong SAR government to explain the situation to the 
leaders in Beijing who may not have a full grasp of the information on 
Hong Kong?4 Anthony Cheung Bing-leung, a former deputy chairman of 
the Party and new chairman of SynergN仗， a think tank , asserted that 
there was no urgency to bring in the law and “ that any move to legislate 
in the near future is bound to cause uncertainty in mainland-Hong Kong 
relations . ,,25 
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Democratic Alliance 101' Bettennent 01 Hong Kong (DAB) and Liberal 
Party 
The DAB was established in 1992 and Liberal Party in 1993. 
Widely perceived as the ‘indigenous CCP' , the DAB scored the biggest 
electoral victory in the LegCo election in September 2004 and is now the 
biggest political group in the LegCo , occupying 13 seats. Liberal Party 
is the second biggest party in the LegCo, having 12 seats. Together, these 
two paliies have a firm grip on the majority votes of the LegCo. Because 
of that, Tsang Yok-sing and James Tien Pei-chun,26 chairmen of both 
parties were invited to join the Exco by Tung Chee-hwa in 2002 , when 
the accountability system was introduced. lt goes without saying that the 
two paJiies have been staunch supporters of all govemment polices, in 
patiicular on the legislation of Article of 23. After the 1 July mass 
demonstrations, the DAB insisted that the Bill should go ahead as 
scheduled to be enacted on 9 July 2003 , but the Liberal Party wavered 
and finally James Tien resigned from the ExCo, meaning that the 
govemment would not obtain sufficient votes in the LegCo and 
consequently forcing Tung Chee-hwa to delay the legislation. 
The Bar Association 
Alan Leung Ka-kit, legislator and then chairman of the Bar 
Association, even hinted at the possibility of a constitutional cnSlS, if 
such legislation were forced through. Similar to Martin Lee, Leung 
reiterated that the existing legislation could provide a set of legal code 
that could deal with activities covered by the Document. On the other 
hand, he argued that under the existing ordinances, the concept of 
secession and subversion against the central goverηment is ambiguous at 
best. The legislation borrows the concepts from Mainland China which 
belongs to another legal system, thereby threatening the common law 
notion of freedom and rights in Hong Kong. The Art icle, fUlihermore, 
violates the provisions of the lntemational Covenant of Political and 
Social rights. ln future , it is likely that such legislation would be dec1 ared 
unconstitutional in the court because the presumed ordinance would be 
against the intemational covenant of social and political ri的ts which is 
contained in the Basic Law.27 
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In July 2002, the Bar Association published a repo此， outlining its 
recommendations regarding the drafting of Article 23. Among the main 
recommendations were the following. First, New legislation must 
conform to Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other 
relevant Basic Law provisions; Second, pure expression of opinion 
should not be criminalized; Third, the Secretary of Justice's consent must 
be obtained for prosecutions under Article 23; Fourth, on sedition, an 
intention to incite violence or create public disorder against the 
‘constituted' authority has to be shown; Fifth, on treason , no objection to 
amending the Crimes Ordinances to reflect the sovereignty change, but 
only action involving or likely to lead to violence to be liable to 
prosecution; Sixth, regarding the缸 of state secrets, review Official Secrets 
Ordinance to keep it in line with Johannesburg Principles on Restriction 
on Freedom of Information; Seventh, on secession, in fact, actual 
secessionist activity is covered under other laws, so there is no need for 
the new legislation.28 
Article 23 Concern Group 
This group rose to prominence during the consultatÌon process and 
consisted mostly senior counsels including Denis Chang, Audrey Eu, 
A1an Leon皂， Ronny Tony and legislator Margaret Ng. The group had" 
estab1ished a website devoted to the discussion ofthe proposed legislation. 
On the proposed legis1ation, the group submitted more than a hundred 
revisions. After the SAR govemment submitted the legislation as the Blue 
Bill , the group published a booklet summarizing their criticism.29 The 
group celiainly had wide spread influence on Hong Kong pub1ic, as they 
were all legal experts with high credibility. 
Other Social/ Religious Groups 
Michael Davis, a human rights and constÌ tutional law specialist, was 
concemed that "there have been intense meeting (between Hong Kong 
officials and mainland officials) in which mainland officials are 
interfering with enactment of this legislation... .perhaps we are consulting 
too much on the content of this. ,,30 Johannes Chan Man-mun, Hong 
Kong University law dean, argued that the existing laws to hand1e 
national security issues were enough.31 He a1so argued that since Elsie 
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Leung had said that the legislation would mostly be based on existing 
legislations, therefore, it was necessary to publish a11 the relevant 
information in order to alleviate the uncertainties of the people.32 
The Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor group led by Mr Law 
Yuk-k缸 in fact , sternly opposed such enactment. Law argued that the 
incumbent legislation already provided sufficient basis for violent 
activities against the Hong Kong SAR government. F or instance, the 
Crime Ordinances could prosecute those who instigate such activities 
against the government. For the theft of state secrets, he argued that the 
Official Secrets Ordinances again was capable of dealing with the theft of 
official secrets. Most importantly, the legislation practically abrogated the 
provisions of freedom of speech and assembly which are guaranteed by 
the Basic Law; ArticIe 27 would be meaningless.33 
Archbishop Joseph Zen Ze-Kiun was totally against the legislation. 
He called on Catholics to join the 1 July demonstration (2003) to express 
their dissatisfaction over the proposed legislation. He strongly urged the 
government to defer the legislation and he believed that ifthe government 
could accept to defer the legislation, the size of demonstration would be 
reduced by hale4 However, Elsie Tu , the colonial fighter before the 
Handover, argued that Bishop Zen's accusations were "groundless" and 
based his judgments on the experiences of the days of the Cultural 
Revolution. She believed that national security bill was necessary in 
Hong Kong, as part of China, and the proposed bill , in fact, was more 
liberal than the security law ofWestern democracies. 35 . 
Foreign 00νernmen肘， Consulates and Press 
Besides the public and the local press, foreign governments, Hong 
Kong- based consul generals , and the foreign press had also expressed 
concern over the issues relating to the legislation of the Article. Most of 
them were \vorried that the freedom of speech, expression and the free 
flow of information would be impacted by the implementation of the 
Article 23 . Subsequently, Hong Kong would become less attractive to the 
international community, and its status as an international commercial 
and financial center would also be affected. The US and UK consulates in 
Hong Kong,36 the British Chamber of Commerce/7 and some foreign 
banks also a11iculated the similar worries .38 The European Union issued a 
statement, expressing the same worries and the European Parliament 
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debated the issue in mid-December 2002. On 30 June 2003 , Bill Rammell, 
the British Foreign Office minister for Hong Kong, warned of the 
proscription of organizations which “ blur the line between two 
autonomous legal systems by introducing into Hong Kong legislation 
linkages to mainland law. ,,39 The editorial of New York Times stated that 
"Freedom of speech could be threatened by a law that would ban 
seditious publications.. .undermine the teITitory 's ability to survive as a 
vibrant financial center that thrives on a free flow of information", and 
that " . ..the violation of Hong Kong's autonomy would devalue Beijing's 
credibility in seeking a peaceful reconciliation with Taiwan."的
Li K wok Po, a local banker and legislator for the banking sector, 
reflected the sentiments of the banking industry. “Banking in Hong Kong 
would be a在ected if press freedom is restrained.. .if the media cannot 
fully and fearlessly reflect news and views truthfully, the information is 
useless--press freedom is what gives us a comparative advantage over 
Singapore竹片 l
Erosion of the high autonomy of Hong Kong was another worry for 
the Western industrialized countries. According to the Article 2 of the 
Basic Law, the HKSAR enjoys a high degree of autonomy, however, the 
British Consulate General of Hong Kong 42, the Asian 防'a ll Street 
Jo叫“nal4 3 and the Bar Association in England and Wales44 all showed 
concern about the proposed provisions about banning organizations in 
Hong Kong affiliated with Mainland organizations which are proscribed 
in the Mainland on national security grounds. A press release by the 
British Consulate-General in Hong Kong on 18 November 2002 said,“It 
is important that the integrity and independence of Hong Kong 's legal 
system, key factors in Hong Kong's success are not compromised by the 
proposed legislation".45 
The lack of transparency, the hasty legislation schedule and the 
refusal to publish the White Bill were other criticisms by the international 
community. The US State Department had urged the SAR government to 
release the exact draft of the proposed legislation of Article 23 for public 
consultation. Philip Reeker, deputy spokesman of the US State 
Departme肘， said that, “ We believe there should be an opportunity for the 
fullest possible consultation on the draft legislation... " .46 1n the press 
release of the British Consulate-General of Hong Kong, it also stated that 
the British govemment w 
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banks, especially banks from US , UK, Germany and France, told me they 
hoped the Hong Kong Govemment would publish a white [bill] first"干
The extra-territorial effect of certain provisions in the proposed 
legislation intensified the debate . The New Zealand government 
expressed great concern over this issue. Phil Goff, the minister of 
foreign affairs and trade, questioned the impact that the proposed 
anti-subversion laws may have on foreign nationals living in Hong Kong 
He said “New Zealand will follow with interest how that proceeds and 
how that may impact upon a New Zealander who, for example, may make 
a comment in New Zealand that could come within this category.,,49 The 
US State Department50, the British Consulate-General in Hong Kong51 
and the New 泊rk Times 52 also expressed the same view. 
Dr. Frances D'Souza, a human rights expe此， who helped to dra丘 the
Johannesburg Principle53 in 1995 , urged the SAR govemment to adopt a 
strict definition of national security and ensure non-violent advocacy and 
even insults to the govemment not be curtailed. On the issue of 
“ subversion" , she said that “The crime of subversion is new to the world. 
1 don't know of any modem jurisprudence which would carry such serve 
penalties for citizen who may unknowingly commit it.,, 54 She thought 
that the anti-subversion legislation under Article 23 would be a major 
blow to freedom and democratic development in Hong Kong. 
Last but - not least, the proposed legislation had attracted public 
attention in other countries. A group of US citizens had written a public 
letter to the US president, urging him to follow closely the issues about 
Article 23 , and make sure that the human rights in Hong Kong would not 
be compromised. 55 Another group of foreign and local scholars had 
written a public letter to the President of the PRC as well , asking him to 
stop the legislation of Article 23 in Hong Kong. 56 The Asian Wall Street 
Journal published an article titled "Broken Promise in Hong Kong" , in 
which the writer argued Beijing was only concemed with the laws 
about national security such as “ treason" and “ subversion" ; however, 
Tung Chee-hwa 's govemment "went on extra mile"切， trying to suppress 
the freedom of press and expression as wel l. 
The Escalation of the Debate 
The Document was heavily criticized by the legal community and 
social groups. Brushing aside opposition voices , the govemment gazetted 
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the National Security Bill on 11 February 2003 and submitted the 
proposed legislation to the LegCo for first and second reading. The public 
demanded a White Bill (full draft of the legislation) be published for 
more thorough consultation. The Article 23 Concem Group suggested 
more than one hundred amendments to the Bill on 13 June 2003. 58 On 14 
June 2003 , when nearly all the legislators of pan-democratic camp 
attended a forum on the Article 23 , held in the Hong Kong University, the 
pro-Beijing legislators passed the original Bill without amendment and 
the govemment made ready to be submitted to the LegCo on 9 July 2003 
for the final enactment. The move angered the public and the mood of 
confrontation intensified. 
As soon as the SAR govemment published the Document a powerful 
political group was formed, named Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), 
comprising f01iy plus social and political groups conceming different 
religious, labour, cultural ， εlass root issues. The CHRF specially set up a 
Article 23 working committee to deal with issues ansmg from the 
legislation of the Article 23. The CHRF organized a 60,000 people 
demonstration opposing Article 23 legislation on 15 December 2002 at 
the end of the three-month consultation period. Moreover, it organized a 
candle night, participated by 1,500 people, when the National Security 
Bill went to LegCo for first reading on 25 Feb. 2003. Finally, the CHRF 
became the most powerful group that organized the world-stunning half 
million July 1 st mass peaceful demonstration against the SAR 
govemment.59 
A group of local scholars reanalyzed the submissions to the 
government at the end of the 3-month period. They found a total of 
369,374 individuals had expressed their opinion on the Document and of 
these 34.6% supported the proposed legislation content, while 62.6% 
opposed. F or those who opposed, the most 0丘en-cited reason was that it 
would hurt human rights and freedom and followed by that reason that it 
would damage one country, two systems and so on.60 Beginning in early 
2003 , the political atmosphere began to be more tense and society 
increasingly polarized. Different groups galvanized forces for suppo此
As the sixth anniversary of the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR 
approached, the democratic camp agreed to stage a mass rally to oppose 
the Bill, although people thought that the chance for the government to 
back-down was slim. Throughout June 2003 , people had be 
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mass media also played a role but none was more active in mobilizing 
than the Apple Dai紗， which practically abandoned the language of 
neutrality and urged people to take part in the demonstration on 1 July 
2003 . 
In the end, more than half a million people tU l11ed up on the streets on 
1 July 2003 to protest against the legislation. The number of 
demonstrators exceeded the wildest expectations of the organizers. Some 
even estimated the people were more than a mi l1 ion. Certainly, this was 
the biggest rally in Hong Kong since 1989. More embarrassingly for the 
SAR gove l11ment was that Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, was in Hong 
Kong to celebrate the sixth anniversary of the establishment of Hong 
Kong SAR. He departed for Shenzhen in the mO l11ing on 1 July. It was 
reported that he watched the drama unfolded and was surprised to find so 
many people tumed up to oppose the SAR govel11ment. 61 
1n the wake of the massive protest, Tung held a crisis meeting with 
his cabinet the next day and decided to go ahead as planned to submit the 
National Security Bi l1 to the LegCo on 9 July 2003 , while promising to 
amend three of the most controversial areas including the removal of 
proscription mechanism, the addition of public interest defence , and to 
withdraw the police power in investigative entry without judicial warrant 
on 5 July 2003. However, despite the insistence of the govemment, the 
lawmakers began to waver as public pressure was mounting. Dr Lo 
Wing-Iok, representing the medical sector, said that he was waiting for 
the results of a questionnaire which he sent to a l1 10,000 doctors in the 
territories, and said, “1 will vote according to the majority view of 
respondents. 1 wi l1 also take into consideration the very loud voice in 
yesterday 's march." James Tien Pei-chun, the Liberal Party chief which 
had been the goverτunent 's staunch suppo口er， now said that the Party's 
eight LegCo members vote would depend on how the government 
responded to the public demand. 62 Moreover, activists wal11ed that they 
would besiege the LegCo building if its plan of enactment were 
unchanged and even wamed that there might be clashes between the 
supporters of the gove l11ment and the opponents on 9 July outside the 
LegCo chamber in central 
Dramatically, coming back from Beijing, James Tien claimed that, 
after consultation with senior officials there , he was told that Beij ing had 
110 timetable for the National Security Bil l. Tien then publicly on 4 July 
a 
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proposing to make three amendments on the Bill as above. Apparently, 
Tien was not satisfied with the move and he declared he would resign 
from the ExCo on 6 July. The ‘ruling coalition' formed in July 2002 
immediately crumbled and the SAR government became a minority 
without the support of the Liberal Party in the LegCo. Tung was forced to 
dec1are the deferment of the final reading of the Bill. 
The Civil Human Rights Front organized two more mass rallies in 
the Central on 9 July and 13 July, attended by thousands of people. 
Gradually, the slogans of the ra11ies shifted to ask the govemment to 
introduce direct elections both on the Chief Executive in 2007 and a11 
LegCo members in 2008. The momentum towards universal 
democratization was so great that the SAR govemment was not able to 
resist it and subsequently led to the intervention of Beijing on Hong 
Kong's internal affairs by re-interpretating the Basic Law on the relevant 
provisions63 in April 2004. 
On 16 J uly 2003 , Regina Ip, Secretary of Security, resigned from her 
post for personal reasons, but apparently for her failure in her bid to 
implement article 23. On the same day, Anthony Leung Kam-chung, the 
Financial Secretary, tendered his resignation letter for an a l1 eged 
con f1 ict of interest. The fiasco of the Bill caused Tung's popularity rating 
to dip to its lowest point since 1997. In a survey conducted by Hong 
Kong University between 14-16 July, 63% of the respondents were 
against his performance and 72% were against him to be the CE. 64 In 
retrospect, 1 July 2003 mass demonstration was the turning point for 
Hong Kong as well as for Tung. It marked the beginning of the end of an 
era of relatively non-interference policy by Beijing and practically the 
end of Tung's political career. Tung resigned from the CE post in March 
2005. The political struggles between the SAR govemment and 
pan-democratic camp and other NGOs in the legislation process of Article 
23 engendered a “new breed of heroes" as the SCMP titled one of its 
reports.的
Conclusion 
The political struggles between the pro-one-country camp and the 
pro-two systems camp on the legislation of Artic1e 23 crystalized the 
conflicts arising from the integration of two regions with two entirely 
different legal traditions, political histories, cultural dimensions and mass 
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psychological experiences. For several decades, Hong Kong was kept 
from the political turmoil and intrigues of Chinese mainland. Having 
escaped from mainland, Hong Kong people coulddo what they wanted in 
daily life under the British rule. Hong Kong had an independent judiciary 
and the colonial rule was benign. Political participation was not the goal 
of daily life until the advent of the 1997 issue. Hong Kong was a 
capitalist paradise where there was no bar on the way to success if one 
works hard enough. 
Since the 1980s, democratization has become one of the most 
impOliant goals that the community strives for. 1n the 1990s, because of 
Governor Chris Pattern's political reform (1 992-1997), the era of party 
politics dawned. The tragedy is that the pace of regression has been 
forced upon by a centralized power center in Beijing. The legislation of 
Article 23 displays the tactics of ‘Leninist integration' by the CCP. The 
super-paradox theorists were too naïve politically. They were 
well-intentioned people, having hopes in the PRC government. As one of 
the advocates Elsie Tu said,“Since the [Cultural Revolution] when a 
quiet and peaceful revolution has made China one of the most 
enlightened governments in the world."“ They were oblivious to the 
changes after the Handover. For example, in 1998 , the introduction of the 
mother-tongue as the medium of instruction in the secondary schools 
aroused strong social resistance , which was against the tradition of 
leaving the secondary schools to choose their own medium of instruction 
No sooner did the policy begin ~q be implemented, than the SAR 
govemment had to back down. 67 /ßn 1999, the abolition of the two 
mmiciw / Coumls anther cemalihd political power in the executive 
branch- y pb l999 巾的市etation by the NPC deprived the jurisdiction 
power o'fthe Court of Final Appeal , putting the NPC as the final arbitrator 
in leεal litigation and able to intervene as it wished.,Finally, the 
introduction of the principal official accountability systein in 2002, 
enhanced the CE's power enormously. Contrary to what the 
super-paradox theories wished to see, the post-Handover has seen the 
incremental absorption of HK into the PRC of Leninist leanings. For 
many people, the vivid imagery of the tanks crushing tents of students 
and the statue of liberty in (the Tiannamen Square) stiU lingers. Despite 
the achievements of the legal system in the past two decades ,68 China 's 
concept of rule of law i 
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policy goals. Patiicularly where political prerogatives are at stake, legal 
requirements appear to pose little restraint on state power."的
The legislation of Article 23 certainly would change the nature of 
Hong Kong legal system. Fortunately, Tung totally failed and on 5 
September 2003 , he withdrew the Bill and without committing to a time 
table. ln September 2004, after the LegCo elections on 10 September, 
Tung once again declared he had no intention of submitting the Bill to the 
LegCo and no timetable was scheduled.7o Tung has had to pay a heavy 
political price in sixteen months.71 The democrats seem to have won a 
big battle over Article 23 , but without realizing that they have lost the war 
on “double universal elections" for 2007-08. 
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